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Abstract
In this paper, we demonstrate a realistic variant of wireless Evil Twins (ETs)
for launching device to device (D2D) attacks over the network, particularly for
Android. An ET can be defined as a rogue Access Point (AP) created by hack-
ers to resemble the authentic AP in a network zone. The existing attacks that
can be launched through ETs include sniffing, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) at-
tack, etc. However, these attacks affect the devices after their association and
transmission of user traffic through an ET. We show an attack where an ET
infects an Android device before the relay of network traffic through it, and
disappears from the network immediately after inflicting the device. The attack
leverages the captive portal facility of wireless networks to launch D2D attack.
We configure an ET to launch a malicious component of an already installed
app in the device on submission of the portal page. For example, the malicious
component can be either a service which opens a port, or sends an SMS to
premium number, or exfiltrates sensitive information to malicious server. Thus,
the attack may lead to any number of consequences. The existing ET detection
solutions on APs are incapable of preventing this attack due to two reasons
- either they analyse an ET after the relay of user traffic through it, or they
can detect this attack only for hardware ETs. In this paper, we present an
online, incremental, automated, fingerprinting based pre-association detection
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mechanism named as ETGuard which works as a client-server mechanism in
real-time. The fingerprints are constructed from the beacon frames transmit-
ted by the wireless APs periodically to inform client devices of their presence
and capabilities in a network. Once detected, ETGuard continuously transmits
deauthentication frames to prevent clients from connecting to an ET. ETGuard
outperforms the existing state-of-the-art techniques from various perspectives.
Our technique does not require any expensive hardware, does not modify any
protocols, does not rely on any network specific parameters such as Round Trip
Time (RTT), number of hops, etc., can be deployed in a real network, is in-
cremental, and operates passively to detect ETs in real-time. To evaluate the
efficiency, we deploy ETGuard in 802.11a/b/g wireless networks. The exper-
iments are conducted using 12 different attack scenarios where each scenario
differs in the source used for introducing an ET. ETGuard effectively detects
ETs introduced either through a hardware, software, or mobile hotspot with
high accuracy, only one false positive scenario, and no false negatives.
Keywords: Evil Twin, D2D Attack, Captive Portal, Android
1. Introduction
With 2 billion active users around the world and 87.5% of the global mar-
ket share[1], Android is currently one of the most popular operating systems.
Android has become a prime target of hackers and malware writers mainly due
to three reasons - firstly, Android holds an enormous user base and relies on
them to take safety critical decisions, such as which server certificates to trust
and install?, what permissions to be granted to the app?, is the Internet con-
nection safe or not?, etc. Secondly, due to the flexibility offered by Android,
developing apps is not a difficult task nowadays. Recently, 3 million apps have
been recorded on Google play store. These novice developers are unaware and
unconcerned about security of the user. For instance, app developers are free
to either mix secure and insecure connections in the same app, or not use SSL
at all. Certificate checking and hostname verification are optional in Android
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and depends on developers. This opens doors for attacks such as MITM, SSL
stripping, etc. Thirdly, Android makes security assumptions which can induce
it to fall as a prey for severe attacks such as remote exploitation, sniffing, etc.
For example, Android recognises a wireless network by its SSID (Service Set
Identifier). SSID is an alpha-numeric string for uniquely identifying an AP. If
any wireless network spoofs the SSID (creates an ET) and arrives in the vicin-
ity of the device, Android assumes it to be the genuine one and connects to
it directly. It may lead to dangerous consequences such as information loss,
financial loss, damage of the device, remote control of the device, etc. ETs
can exploit the app vulnerabilities of SSL implementation in Android to launch
phishing attacks. ETs can redirect download and installation requests for apps
downloaded from websites instead of Google playstore to malicious APK files.
Thus, Android becomes an easy target for attackers.
ETs are easy to create and launch in a network. They can be created sim-
ply by spoofing SSID. Further, attacker physically situates the ET adjacent to
targeted user base for captivating victim’s wireless connection by transmitting
stronger signal strength, and continuously sending deauthentication frames for
legitimate APs to force victims to lose their present wireless connection. Thus,
users are tend to get connected to the ET.
A lot of work has been conducted in the direction of ET detection. We
categorise the existing solutions in two categories - post-association and pre-
association. The post-association techniques identify an AP as an ET after
associating with it. They use various parameters to identify an ET such as
ETSniffer[2] uses hop count to identify an ET. CETAD[3] recognises an ET
by computing its Internet Service Provider (ISP) and RTT. Song et al.[4] cal-
culates inter-packet arrival time between hops to discover an ET. WifiHop[5]
relays watermarked packets on associated wireless network before any user traf-
fic. It monitors the path traversed by watermarked packets to detect an ET.
The pre-association techniques disclose an AP as an ET before associating with
it. Bratus et al.[6] creates fingerprints of 802.11 MAC responses from routers.
However, this approach can not detect an ET launched using mobile phones or
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softwares. Tang et al.[7] utilises Received Signal Strength Indicators (RSSI) to
catch an ET. However, this approach is only for stabilised APs, and can not
detect an ET from softwares or mobile devices. Unfortunately, no such tech-
nique exists which can effectively and efficiently detect a wireless AP as an ET
(launched either through a hardware, software, or mobile phone) before associ-
ating with it.
In this paper, we present a practical approach to conduct D2D attack in
the network using ETs. D2D communication is defined as the establishment
of link between devices using communication channels (wired or wireless)[21].
Here, we consider the channel to be wireless. We define D2D attack as an
exploit where one device (A) launches a malicious activity on another device
(B) through the wireless communication channel. In our case, we consider A
to be either an Android device, or a laptop, or a wireless router, and B to be
an Android device. We illustrate an attack using the captive portal feature of
wireless networks to attack the device before relay of network traffic through it.
A captive portal is an obligatory web interface for authenticating/managing a
user before Internet access is granted. It is mainly used for public places such
as airports, educational institutes, enterprise networks, etc., to keep a track of
connected users or prevent any external user from getting access to a premises
network. We create an ET for a network which adopts captive portal for user
management. As soon as user launches the portal, ET launches a malicious ser-
vice present on the device which secretly opens a port for the attacker to steal
sensitive information. After infecting user’s device, the ET gets disconnected
from the network instantaneously. Thus, the ET can launch an attack without
leaving any trace behind.
This paper presents an automated, online, incremental, fingerprinting based
pre-association solution for detecting ETs in real-time for infrastructure based
networks. The proposed solution follows a client-server architecture where fin-
gerprints are stored on the server, and a client side interface in the form of
an Android app is provided to the users. Whenever a user sends a request for
scanning the network for ETs, the app communicates to the server, and the
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server scans the network by comparing the currently available APs fingerprints
with the stored fingerprints. The app displays SSID, BSSID (Basic Service Set
Identifier) and signal strengths of all the available APs in the network. This
provides a detailed view of the network to the user, and if any suspicious AP is
encountered, user may request the servers to scan the network via the app.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• This paper presents a practical version of D2D attacks through ETs in the
network. We illustrate an archetype application of the attack and explain
the serious consequences of the attack on Android devices.
• We propose a fingerprinting based pre-association solution for detecting
ETs in an infrastructure based network that outperforms the existing ET
detection techniques. The proposed detection mechanism is a client-server
solution to detect an ET before the association and relay of user traffic
through it. Our technique is incremental, does not require any expensive
hardware, does not modify any protocols, does not rely on any network
specific parameters such as RTT, number of hops, etc., remains online,
and operates passively to detect ETs in real-time.
• We utilise beacon frames to detect ETs. Since the fields of beacon frames
are hardware, driver, security configurations and signal strength depen-
dent, and vary from hardware to software to mobile hotspots, therefore,
beacon frame fingerprinting is effective in detecting ETs in a network.
• We implement our proposed approach through a prototype known as ET-
Guard. We have profusely evaluated ETGuard by creating 12 experiment
environments with hardware/software/hotspot ETs introduced in them.
ETGuard successfully detects ETs with high accuracy, extremely low false
positive rate and no false negatives.
The organisation of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the attack
scenario and consequences associated with it. Section 3 explains the beacon
frame fields used for fingerprinting, defines D2D attack, and classifies ET attack
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scenarios. Section 4 introduces ETGuard, and describes the architecture and
methodology of ETGuard. Section 5 highlights the experimental evaluation of
ETGuard on real-time attacking scenarios, and comparison of ETGuard with
the existing state-of-the-art techniques. Section 6 explains the state-of-the-
approaches for ET detection. Section 7 concludes the paper with future work.
2. Threat Model and Assumptions
ET attacks had been a focus of researchers for more than a decade. However,
the research community considered only the networking aspect of ET attacks,
i.e., user traffic sniffing or MITM attack. Sniffing and MITM attacks can harm
the user only when user associates to the ET, and start generating network
traffic through it. We present an attack scenario which causes damage before
the generation of any user traffic through the ET. In this section, we explain
the attack scenario - Invoking Malicious Component.
2.1. Invoking Malicious Component
In this attack, the attacker can launch any activity/service of an app present
on the device. Suppose an attacker repackages a benign app (U ) by including a
malicious service (V ) in it which sends an SMS to premium numbers. This ser-
vice is not invoked by any component of the app, and hence, the app hoaxes the
scanners and bouncers of playstore and other app markets, and gets published.
2.1.1. Assumptions
We assume that there is a wireless network named CSE in a premises (such
as educational institute, industry, airport, etc.) with the following features:
• It uses captive portal facility to grant Internet access.
• It does not use any passphrase security.
• The target Android device has U installed which contains V.
• The network is neither behind NAT (Network Address Translation), nor
protected by firewalls.
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2.1.2. Attack Scenario
The steps used to launch the attack are as follows:
• We introduce an ET of “CSE” with the captive portal similar to the origi-
nal one by using Coovachilli[8], hostapd[9] and Easyhotspot[10]. Coovachilli
serves as an access controller for the ET. It diverts the client to the fake
captive portal page by blocking the wireless traffic. Hostapd performs the
function of spoofing and broadcasting the beacon frames for the ET. We
spoof SSID and BSSID of the ET to make it similar to “CSE”. Easy-
hotspot is used to customise the captive portal provided by Coovachilli
to look exactly similar to that of “CSE”. Hence, the users do not get
suspicious of the portal page received on getting connected to an ET of
“CSE”.
• An ET is placed at a location that provides a higher signal strength than
the existing genuine AP. We transmit deauthentication frames for the
legitimate AP to disconnect the users from it. Thus, the Android users
will be connected directly to the fake AP.
• As soon as the device gets connected to the ET, it gives a notification of
“Sign into the network” on the user device, similar to the genuine one.
Thus, the user does not get suspicious and clicks on it.
• On clicking the notification, the user is redirected to the maliciously
spoofed captive portal page wherein users provide their username and
password. When they click on the submit button, the intent V gets
launched on the device. As soon as V is launched, the ET disappears
from the network. As the attack launches a service, the user remains un-
aware that anything fishy has happened on his device, and subsequently
gets connected to the legitimate AP. Thus, an ET creeps in the network,
harms the device, and vanishes without leaving any traces behind. The
attack can prove extremely dangerous for the user, if the service opens a
port secretly. The malicious service can either execute netstat command,
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or read /proc/<pid>/net/tcp file to identify open ports on the device (we
assume that the ports are bind to local IP1 address), and further launch
attacks such as information theft, malware installation, remote control,
etc [11]. Notably, no special permissions are required to scan the ports on
the device [11]. Thus, the impact of this attack can be dangerous for the
user.
• Additionally, we steal the username and password entered by the user.
This can be misused to get illegitimate access to the network.
Listing 1: Code snippet for launching an activity or service of an app on Android device using
ET
<a href="intent://scan/#Intent;
scheme=my.special.scheme.V;
package=com.example.vineeta.
U;end">
<input name="accept" type="button"
value="LOGIN" style="cursor:pointer;"></a>
Listing 1 displays the code for launching the service V of the app U installed
on the device using the fake captive portal page of an ET. In Listing 1, the tag
<input name=“accept” type=“button” value=“LOGIN” style=“cursor:pointer;”>
denotes the HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) code of the LOGIN button on
the portal page. The HTML tag <a> preceding the code of the LOGIN button
explains that a link opens on clicking that button. However, in place of the link,
the attacker maliciously invokes a service by launching an intent. Intents are
used in Android for inter-component communication among apps [12]. The com-
ponents of an app can summon other components of the same or different apps
using Intents. The code intent://scan/#Intent;scheme=my.special.scheme.V;
package=com. example.vineeta.U; shows that the intent will invoke the service
V of the app U (containing package name as com.example.vineeta.U) support-
ing the scheme my.special.scheme.V. Package name uniquely identifies an app on
1IP address stands for Internet Protocol address
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the device, and scheme defines the type of the data handled by the intent [12].
Scheme can be either pre-defined (such as images, videos, etc.), or custom-
defined (such as mail) [12]. Thus, as the user clicks on the LOGIN button of
the fake portal page, the malicious service gets launched on his device.
Evil Twin of CSE
Client Device
<a href="intent://scan/#Intent;
scheme=my.special.scheme;
package=com.example.vineeta.
androidapktransferserver;end">
<input name="accept"
 type="button" 
value="LOGIN" 
style="cursor:pointer;"></a>
invokes a service
which sends an SMS
String phoneNumber = premium number;
String message = "Hello World!";
SmsManager smsManager = 
SmsManager.getDefault();
smsManager.sendTextMessage
(phoneNumber, null, message, null, null);
SEND_SMS
Figure 1: Invoking the malicious service which sends an SMS to premium numbers.
Figure 1 describes the attack scenario where the invoked service is sending mes-
sages to premium numbers. Thus, the D2D attack using ETs may have deadly
ramifications.
Since captive portal is a web page which authenticates and accounts the
activities of the user in a network, many web based attacks can be launched
through the portal. Xia et al. [13] have demonstrated the launch of session
hijacking attack through captive portal. In this attack, the attacker transmits
deauthentication frames to disconnect the genuine user from the network, and
mimics the MAC (Media Access Control) address and DHCP (Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol) network configuration of the user. Thus, the attacker
acts as a valid user in the network by hijacking the session. Adrian et al. [14]
launch browser history stealing attack through captive portal. The attacker
modifies the portal page by including a large number of image references with
links. The page checks the links against the persistent cookies database of
the user’s device, and logs the cookies which are associated to the links in the
database. However, this attack requires a huge DNS (Domain name System)
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lookup time (which can make a user suspicious), and a large database of websites
against which the cookies of the users are checked. Chen et al. [15] proposes a
MITM attack using ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) spoofing to bypass the
captive portal, and access Internet without getting authenticated. The attacker
locates itself between authenticated client and AP, and conduct IP masquerad-
ing to access Internet.
A lot of ET attacks have also been proposed in the literature. Karma at-
tack [16] sniffs the probe request of the client, and on the basis of requested
parameters, automatically creates an AP on the fly. Catch-All-Evil-Twin at-
tack [17] creates multiple ETs for a single SSID with all types of security con-
figurations. DNS Spoofing [18] and SSL Stripping [19] attacks are launched
after acquiring a MITM position between client and AP in the network. In
DNS Spoofing, the attackers replace the requests from clients with their choice
of web pages. In SSL Stripping, attackers convert HTTPS (Secured Hypertext
Transfer Protocol) link to HTTP link on the fly.
The above mentioned attacks either cause loss of information to user, or re-
move the user from the network, or perform the classic attacks (such as sniffing,
MITM attack) in a different way. But, neither of these attacks can harm the
user before getting connected to Internet, nor harm the device of the user, nor
cause financial loss directly. Invoking Malicious Component attack introduces
an ET in the network, fools an Android user by presenting a cloned captive
portal, and when the user clicks on the LOGIN button, invokes an already
present malicious component of an app. This component may cause financial
loss (such as sending an SMS to premium number), or information loss (such
as sharing the location, browser history), or provide a backdoor to the device
(such as open a port). Notably, all attack steps are performed before the relay
of network traffic, and the attacker needs not to be present in the network for a
long time. As soon as the device gets infected, attacker can simply switch the
ET off, and allow the user to connect to the genuine AP. So, tracking the ET is
extremely challenging. Therefore, a technique is required to scan for ETs in a
network before the establishment of connection between the ET and the device.
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3. Preliminaries
In this section, we explain beacon frame components of APs which contribute
in ET detection, define D2D attacks on Android, and classify ETs and ET attack
scenarios in three categories on the basis of ecosystem and the position of the
ET in the network, respectively.2
3.1. Beacon Frame Components
Beacon frame is a management frame transmitted by an AP for broadcasting
its capabilities to client devices in a network. Beacon frame body encloses
information about the properties of the AP. It includes mandatory and optional
fields of fixed and variable lengths. The variable length fields are known as
Information Elements (IEs)[20]. In this paper, we are employing beacon frame
fingerprinting to differentiate between a genuine AP and its ET. The following
fields are used for fingerprinting:
• Beacon Interval : It illustrates the time between two beacon frame trans-
missions. The default value is 102.4 milliseconds.
• Capability Information: It contains 14 subfields which represents the re-
quired network capabilities which should be fulfilled by a client station, in
order to connect to an AP. For example, if the value of Wireless Equivalent
Privacy (WEP) flag of an AP is 1, only those clients which also enforces
WEP for privacy, are permitted to connect to the AP.
• SSID : It is an alphanumeric string which uniquely recognises an AP in
a network. The APs are visible to user by these names. It is a variable
length IE whose length lies in the range of 0− 32 bytes.
• Supported Rates : It is a variable length IE that displays all the mandatory
and supported data rates by an AP. An AP must have at least one manda-
tory rate, and can have multiple supported rates. Any client station that
wishes to get connected to an AP must support all mandatory data rates.
2The paper follows this classification and terminology.
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• Traffic Indication Map (TIM): TIM field of beacon frame is a variable
length IE that represents information about the sleeping client stations
with pending frames, and intervals during which the AP attempts to de-
liver the frames. Every beacon frame does not carry information about
buffered frames. An element known as Delivery Traffic Indication Map
(DTIM) carries information about the interval between beacon frames be-
fore a beacon containing details of buffered frames is transmitted. It varies
from AP to AP.
• Country: There are regulatory bodies in every country that impose re-
strictions in their domains regarding the permitted channels and power
levels. It is a variable length IE which specifies the country whose restric-
tions the AP follows, the permitted channels and the maximum power
levels followed by the AP.
• Robust Security Network (RSN): An AP can administer encryption tech-
niques for unicast and multicast traffic in a network. RSN is a variable
length IE that demonstrates details about cipher suites used for authen-
tication and encryption. It also defines other RSN capabilities such as
authentication key management.
• Extended Support Rates : the beacon frame field known as Supported Rates
can only store values for 8 data rates. If any AP wishes to support more
than 8 data rates, that information is represented in Extended Support
Rates IE.
• Vendor-Specific: It is a variable length IE (up to 252 bytes) which is provi-
sioned to always be present as a last element in the frame body of beacon.
This is common for every OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) to
put their own proprietary information within the beacon frames.
• The beacon frame also consists of a MAC header. MAC stands for Media
Access Control. It is a sub-layer of DLL (Data link layer) in OSI (Open
System Interconnect) model. All the components of 802.11 falls under
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the MAC layer of DLL. All the fields in the MAC header of management
frame are mandatory and of fixed length. From the MAC header fields,
we have taken in use BSSID field as it signifies the MAC address of the
AP to uniquely identify it in a network.
3.2. Definition of D2D Attack
“D2D communication is defined as the establishment of link between devices
using communication channels (wired or wireless). D2D attack is defined as an
exploit where one device (A) launches a malicious activity on another device
(B) through the wireless communication channel”[21]. In our case, we consider
A to be either an Android device, or a laptop, or a wireless router, and B to be
an Android device.
3.3. Types of ETs
This classification is based on the type of environment used for creating ETs.
They can be created using the following three methods:
• Hardware: A hardware device such as router can be used to introduce
the ET in a network. This is an expensive method, and thus, rarely used
by the attackers.
• Software: This is the most prevalent method for introducing ETs in a
network. Many open source softwares are available to create ETs using
laptops such as hostapd, Connectify, ap-hotspot, aircrack-ng, etc.
• Mobile devices: ETs can be created using tethering facility of smart-
phones. This is apparently easy than the other methods as it does not
require any additional expertise. However, they cater the attackers com-
paratively less control over the ET, as they allow the attackers to modify
very limited number of parameters such as SSID and BSSID. Thus, they
are not preferred for specialised ET attacks.
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3.4. Launching ET Attacks
We have classified ET attack scenarios in a network in three classes on the
basis of location of an ET in the network:
Genuine AP
Target Users
Evil Twin
Target Users
Stronger Signal
Strength
Genuine AP
Evil Twin
(a) Normal Scenario (b) Substitution Attack Scenario
(c) Colocation Attack Scenario (d) Remote Location Attack Scenario
Evil Twin
Figure 2: Classification of attack scenarios on the basis of position of ET in the network.
• Substitution: In this scenario, attacker replaces the genuine AP with
the ET at the same location.
• Colocation: In this scenario, attacker colocates the ET near the genuine
AP, and transmits stronger signal strength to allure users to connect to
them.
• Remote Location: In this scenario, the genuine AP was previously
present in the network. Thus, the profile of genuine AP exists in the
devices of users. When the attackers introduce ET in this network at
any location, users automatically get connected to the ET, due to the
saved profile in the devices of users. This scenario is different from Sub-
stitution attack scenario in terms of location of the ET, and Colocation
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attack scenario in terms of the signal strength. In this case, ETs need not
to transmit stronger signal strength, and the location of the ETs in the
network need not to be same as the genuine AP.
Figure 2 describes the three attack scenarios used for launching ET attacks.
4. ETGuard
This section explains the workflow and methodology of ETGuard to detect
ETs in an infrastructure based network.
4.1. ETGuard Overview
We present ETGuard, an online, automated, incremental, real-time pre-
association analysis tool that accumulates the unique fingerprints of legitimate
APs present in a network, and provides a client interface in the form of an
Android app to users for effectively scanning the network to detect ETs in real-
time. Figure 3 shows the workflow of ETGuard. It consists of the following 7
modules:
Figure 3: Workflow of ETGuard
• Request Handler: It concurrently captures the ET detection requests
from devices, and forwards it further to Packet Handler module. It is
implemented using a circular buffer, and can create multiple instances of
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itself when the user requests reach the threshold. Thus, it is capable of
preventing denial of service attacks. The transmission of requests from
user device to the Request Handler and vice versa are protected by TLS
(Transmission Layer Security) to prevent tampering and eavesdropping.
• Packet Handler: The Packet Handler module collects beacon frames of
APs present in the vicinity.
• Extractor: The Packet Handler successively transmits the captured bea-
con frames to the Extractor. The Extractor module extracts the relevant
fields from the beacon frames to construct fingerprints.
• Processing Module: The extracted fields are merged to construct finger-
prints for the APs. If any field is not present in an AP, it is substituted by
NULL. Further, these fingerprints are transferred to Fingerprint Storage
Engine.
• Fingerprint Storage Engine: The fingerprints are matched across the
stored fingerprints. If a perfect match is found, the AP is a genuine AP.
The partial matching rules and ET detection is explained in detail in
Subsection 4.4.
• Fingerprint Update Engine: If any new AP is found in the vicinity, it
gets added in the fingerprint database. Thus, the system is incremental.
Even if any of the beacon frame fields of any genuine AP gets modified,
the corresponding fingerprint is updated by this module.
• Deauth: This module broadcasts deauthentication frames for the de-
tected ETs to forcefully disconnect all its associated clients.
The modules of ETGuard are sequenced in time. The architecture of ETGuard
consists of two components - server and client. The client side component in-
cludes the app interface for users, and server side component handles the beacon
frame fingerprinting for a network. Figure 4 shows the sequence diagram of ET-
Guard in the network. Before associating with any AP, client device sends ET
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Figure 4: Sequence Diagram of ETGuard
detection request signals to the ETGuard server through the ETGuard client
app to passively scan the network for ETs3. Further, server captures the beacon
frames, and matches the fingerprints with the legitimate fingerprints to anal-
yse the genuineness of the AP. The server responds back with an ET detection
response, and subsequently if the AP is not an ET, client device sends associa-
tion request to the AP. Otherwise, the app highlights the ET with red color in
the WI-FI list for the users. ETGuard server also broadcasts deauthentication
frames for the ET to forcefully disconnect all its associated clients. Thus, it
prevents user from associating to ETs in the network.
4.2. Server Analysis of ETGuard
In order to detect ETs in a network, we incorporate beacon frame finger-
printing mechanism. The server accommodates the beacon frame fingerprints
of legitimate APs. For sniffing ETs, server passively scans the network by cap-
turing the beacon frames on all available channels, and compares it with the
stored fingerprints (complete algorithm is explained in Subsection 4.4). Before
3In the rest of paper, server stands for ETGuard server and client stands for ETGuard
client app
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we explain the functionality of server, we need to answer a few questions:
• Do all fields of beacon frame contribute in ET detection?
• Why beacon frame fingerprinting is efficient in differentiating legitimate
AP from the fake ones?
• Do the fields that change dynamically in beacon frames in a real environ-
ment can contribute in ET detection?
• If AP and ET belong to the same OEM, can ETGuard detect the fake
one?
For the first question, all the fields in beacon frame do not contribute in finger-
printing mechanism of ETGuard, as some of the fields differ from beacon to bea-
con of an AP in a real network scenario, such as channel information, timestamp
values, sequence number, frame check sequence, etc. Only those fields whose val-
ues remain constant across all the beacon frames transmitted by an AP are con-
sidered for fingerprinting. The fields used for beacon frame fingerprinting are:
BSSID, Beacon Interval, Capability Information, SSID, Supported Rates,
TIM, DTIM, Country, RSN, Extended Support Rates, and Vendor-Specific.
Out of the above 11 fields, 6 fields are optional in beacon frame. To judge
whether these 6 optional fields of beacon frames are present in the APs of real
world or not, we captured the beacon frames of about 50 APs, and created
a dataset named MNIT dataset. Since the dataset is prepared by capturing
beacon frames of APs from public places (such as railway stations, airports),
educational institutions, coffee shops and corporate organisations, therefore, the
dataset gives a fair knowledge about the presence of these fields in practical sce-
narios. By analysing the dataset, we observed that these 6 optional fields are
present in 95% of the APs. Table 1 presents the experimental results of 10 APs
from the dataset.
For the second question, beacon frame is a frame transmitted by an AP to
broadcast its capabilities to clients in a network. The capabilities differ from
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Table 1: Analysis results of MNIT Dataset
SSID of the AP* TIM Country Extended Support Rates RSN Vendor-Specific
SSID 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
SSID 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SSID 3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SSID 4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SSID 5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SSID 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SSID 7 ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
SSID 8 ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
SSID 9 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
SSID 10 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
*We have anonymised the names of APs for security purposes.
OEM to OEM for hardware AP, from hardware AP to software AP, from hard-
ware AP to mobile hotspot, and from mobile hotspot to software AP. Following
are the arguments for using beacon frame fingerprinting:
• TIM element in the beacon frames is used for buffering data for low-power
devices. This is a non-configurable field as it depends on the load of
buffered data. We observed that the default TIM element length (when
no data is buffered) for beacon frames of mobile hotspot is different than
the hardware and software APs. For mobile hotspot the default length is
9, whereas for software and hardware APs, the default length is 4. Since,
it is not a configurable field in beacon frames, thus, the difference in the
lengths of this element in the beacon frame aids in the detection of ET
through mobile hotspots.
• Capability Information element highlights the various capabilities of
an AP such as whether an AP can support WEP or not, whether an AP
is using block ACK or not, etc. Some of the capabilities are hardware and
driver dependent, and could not be modified such as delayed acknowledge-
ment, immediate acknowledgement, use of short preamble, etc. If an ET
is created using a software AP or different hardware, capabilities differ.
• Supported Rates element holds different rates for different APs. A hard-
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ware AP supports more rates as compared to software AP and hotspot.
APs also contain an Extended Support Rates element which contains ad-
ditional rates supported by an AP. By default, software APs contain less
mandatory fields and more Extended Support Rates. However, in hard-
ware APs, extended ones are less and mandatory ones are more. This field
is also hardware and driver dependent.
• Vendor-Specific element is different for different OEMs, and present
in all hardware APs. It cannot be modified as it contains proprietary
information about vendors.
• An attacker can possibly use social engineering to identify the security
passphrase for the legitimate AP. If an attacker adopts the similar RSN
settings and BSSID as of legitimate one, this will prevent user from di-
rectly getting connected to the ET[22], as two APs with same BSSIDs
and security settings on a channel restricts Android device to instantly
connect to an AP. Thus, for alluring users to promptly connect to an ET,
attacker keeps last digit of BSSID different from the legitimate one.
Hence, beacon frame fingerprinting is an effective technique to recognise an ET
in an infrastructure based network.
For the third question, the dynamically changing fields such as timestamp,
sequence number, TIM, etc., represent the network parameters and load of an
AP. We use TIM Information Element for ET detection. For the TIM element,
DTIM count (explained in Subsection 3.1) remains constant, and used for fin-
gerprinting. The value of DTIM count differs from OEM to OEM and hardware
to software AP. For hardware APs the value is 1, and for software APs and
mobile hotspots, the value is 2. The hardware AP and mobile hotspot does
not provide user control to change the field. In case of software AP, hostapd
provides user control for configuration of this field in beacon frames.
For the fourth question, the default configuration fields such as Country,
Supported Rates, Extended Support Rates, Vendor-Specific, are similar in APs
belonging to same OEM. Thus, if an attacker manages to introduce a hardware
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ET of the same OEM in the network by forging its SSID and BSSID, and the
genuine AP is not using any type of security, beacon frame fingerprinting is not
sufficient for detection of ETs. For this purpose, we enforce signal strength in-
dicator fingerprinting in ETGuard to detect ETs belonging to same OEM. The
transmitted beacon frame also carries a header named Radiotap Header. It
includes information about the signal strength of the AP. The signal strength
of two APs can never be same, and cannot be forged. Two APs located at two
different places will always transmit different signal strengths. However, signal
strengths may oscillate due to hazy effects of radio signals[23]. But it always
lies in a fixed range. In order to attract users, ETs have to transmit a signal
strength higher than the highest signal strength offered by the legitimate AP.
Hence, ETGuard also stores the highest signal strength offered by an AP to
justify its legitimacy in case of ET and AP belonging to the same OEM.
4.3. Methodology
This subsection algorithmically explains the methodology adopted at the
server side of ETGuard for detection of ETs.
Suppose, there is an infrastructure network In with a legitimate AP named
as P . Let the beacon frame of P be denoted as PB . ETGuard fingerprints the
hex values of the following fields of PB:
• PSSID: SSID
• PBSSID: BSSID
• PBI : Beacon Interval
• PCI : Capability Information
• PSPR: Supported Rates
• PDTIM : DTIM Period
• PTIM : TIM Length
• PCON : Country
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• PESR: Extended Support Rates
• PRSN : Robust Security Network
• PV EN : Vendor-specific
ETGuard also stores the highest signal strength offered by the AP separately
as PSSI
4. Let the fingerprint of P be represented as PF . The fingerprint of the
AP is constructed as:
(1)PF = PSSID ‖ PBSSID ‖ PBI ‖ PCI ‖ PSPR ‖
PDTIM ‖ PTIM ‖ PCON ‖ PESR ‖ PRSN ‖ PV EN
For the ETs constructed using software and mobile phones, the fingerprints
will be different, and thus, will get detected. Let us discuss a case where an
attacker can evade this detection mechanism. Suppose, an attacker introduces
a hardware ET of P by using the device of exactly same model and OEM as
of P . Let us suppose, a perfect match is found between the fingerprints of P
and P ′ as devices of same model and OEM have exactly same hardware and
driver values. It then compares the signal strength of the P with the stored
value of PSSI . Since ETs attract users by offering higher signal strength than
the genuine ones, therefore, the ET gets detected.
4.4. Detection Algorithm
Whenever a user requests ETGuard to analyse network for ETs, ETGuard
momentarily captures beacon frames and extracts the hex values of various
fields. The Radiotap Header (containing information about the SSI field) and
header of beacon frame are the first two hex chunks in any beacon frame. They
are of fixed length. The fields of beacon frame body are variable in length,
and furthermore, they can be present in any order in beacon frame. Therefore,
we utilise the IEEE 802.11 unique numerical identifiers for extracting the hex
values of these fields. Table 2 displays the identifiers of fields used for detection
in ETGuard. After extracting the hex values, Algorithm 1 is applied to detect
4SSI stands for Signal Strength Indicator
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Table 2: Identifiers for fields of beacon frame body
S.No. Frame Body Field Identifier
1 SSID 0
2 Supported Rates 1
3 TIM 5
4 Extended Support Rates 50
5 Vendor-Specific 221
6 RSN 48
7 Country 7
whether the AP is an ET or not.
ETGuard classifies the AP in three categories:
• Legitimate AP
• an ET
• Unregistered on the network
If the extracted fingerprint does not match with any of the stored fingerprints,
ETGuard compares the SSID to confirm intention of the AP. If the SSID matches
with the genuine one, ETGuard identifies it as an ET, else an unregistered AP.
Thus, ETGuard is capable of detecting any and every type of ET in
an infrastructure based network.
5. Results and Discussion
We implemented the detection algorithm through a prototype named ET-
Guard (Evil Twin Guard) to evaluate usability, accuracy and performance of
the proposed approach. This section explains the implementation of ETGuard,
and describes a case study conducted in our institute to evaluate the efficiency
of ETGuard in a real network scenario.
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Algorithm 1 Detection Algorithm
1: procedure ETGuard(P ′
B
)
2: P ′
F
← Fingerprint of P’
3: DF ← Database of genuine fingerprints
4: for each PF in DF do
5: if P ′
F
6= PF then
6: if P ′
SSID
6= PSSID then
7: P’ is an unregistered AP
8: else
9: P’ is an ET of P
10: else
11: P ′
SSI
← Signal Strength of P’
12: if P ′
SSI
> PSSI then
13: P’ is an ET of P
14: else
15: P ≡ P ′
5.1. Implementation
ETGuard consists of 7 modules (as explained in Section 4). The Request
Handler collects the request of users, and concurrently forwards it to Packet
Handler. The Packet Handler captures beacon frames using tshark[24] on 13
channels of the network in pcap[25] format. Further, the pcap files for all
the channels are merged in a single file which is provided as an input to the
Extractor. It extracts the relevant fields from the beacon frames one by one,
and forwards it to the Processing Module. The pcap file contains redundant
beacon frames as an AP transmit a beacon frame every 102.4ms[20]. To avert
the extraneous time and resources in analysing an AP twice, Extractor uses
the sequence Number field present in the header of beacon frame. It stores the
sequence number of the analysed beacon frame, and if the subsequent beacon
frame contains a sequence number one greater than the previous one, it does not
analyse the frame, and updates the sequence number with the new one. This
avoids the repetitive fingerprint creation of the APs. The Processing Module
constructs the fingerprints, and Fingerprint Storage Engine further checks it
against the mysql fingerprint database (according to the Algorithm 1). The
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analysis results are generated in real-time as query processing in mysql database
is extremely fast.
5.2. Case Study
We conducted a case study in MNIT Jaipur[26] campus network environment
to assess the launch of D2D attacks on Android devices, before and after the
implementation of ETGuard in the network.
5.2.1. Dataset
We created a fingerprint database for legitimate APs present in the MNIT
Jaipur campus using mysql database. The beacon frames are captured using
tshark, hex values are extracted using python scripts, and relevant field values
are stored in mysql database named eviltwin. We have automated the process
of fingerprint generation to remove the manual errors. We have also imple-
mented a Fingerprint Update Module to update the fingerprints and add a new
one. Thus, the fingerprinted database is incremental, and can be extended upto
a large number of APs.
5.2.2. Experimental Setup
We set up ETGuard under MNIT Jaipur campus network environment on
a laptop (ubuntu 14.04) with a wireless network card. To enable client-side
detection, we installed the ETGuard client app on the Android devices of the
scholars in phd lab. The app is installed on 5 different versions of Android
(Jelly Bean[27], Kitkat[28], Lollipop[29], Marshmallow[30] and Nougat[31]), and
devices of 4 different OEMs such as Lenovo, Sony, Redmi, and Motorola. We
define a normal scenario as an environment where there are legitimate AP
CSE, ETGuard and users present in the network. We define an attack scenario
as the environment setup where legitimate AP CSE, ETGuard, users and an ET
of CSE are present in the network. In normal scenario, devices are connected
to the legitimate AP, and ETGuard server is waiting for detection requests. In
attack scenario, an ET of CSE gets introduced in the network.
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5.2.3. Detection
To evaluate the efficacy of ETGuard in detecting ETs in a network, we
launch ETs using hardware, software and mobile hotspot in an environment
where ETGuard is already present. We analyse the efficiency of ETGuard on
the channels supporting IEEE 802.11a/b/g protocols.
The hardware ETs used for the experiments include D-Link DIR-615Wireless-
N300 Router[32], Digisol DG-HR1400 Wireless Broadband Router[33], TP-Link
TL-WR841N 300Mbps Wireless-N Router[34] and Mi 3C Router[35]. We con-
figure the SSID, BSSID, channel and frequency band of these hardware ETs
similar to the legitimate AP CSE. The signal strength of the ETs is kept higher
than the legitimate ones to attract user traffic. ETGuard successfully detects
all the hardware ETs. Table 4 enumerates the similar and disjoint fields in the
beacon frames of ETs as compared to the genuine one. Table 4 clearly high-
lights that many parameters of these ETs differ from the legitimate one. The
Digisol DG-HR1400 Wireless Broadband Router and D-Link DIR-615 Wireless-
N300 Router carry different Capability Information, Supported Rates, Extended
Support Rates and Vendor-Specific information than the legitimate one. The
TP-Link TL-WR841N 300Mbps Wireless-N Router has similar Capability Infor-
mation field, but contains distinct Supported Rates, Extended Support Rates
and Vendor-Specific fields. The Mi 3C Router carries an additional Country
field in the beacon frame which is not present in the legitimate one. Even if the
original AP does not contains RSN settings, ETs will be detected due to the
difference in other fields. Thus, ETGuard can effectively detect the ETs
created using hardware of different OEMs.
We introduce an ET named CSE using the similar hardware as of the legiti-
mate one5. Thus, the beacon frame values other than BSSID, RSN and SSI are
similar by default. We forge the BSSID, do not implement any type of security,
and maintain a higher signal strength. As the original AP is using RSN, ET-
Guard detects the ET. Further, we conduct an experiment with similar security
5We are not revealing the OEM of AP due to security reasons
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settings in the ET as of the original one. As mentioned before in Subsection
4.2, if security settings are applied, we need to modify the BSSID for launching
attack on the same channel. We modify the last digit of BSSID for performing
the attack. Hence, ETGuard identifies the ET using the BSSID field. Next, we
maintain the values of RSN and BSSID similar to the legitimate one. However,
we are transmitting a greater signal strength for attracting users, and therefore,
the ET gets detected by using the SSI field. Hence, ETGuard is capable of
detecting ETs belonging to the same hardware.
We introduce the software AP named CSE with the captive portal similar
to the original one by using Coovachilli[8] + hostapd[9] + Radius Server[36]
+ Easyhotspot[10]. Coovachilli serves as an access controller for the hotspot.
It diverts the client to the captive portal page by blocking the wireless traf-
fic. Hostapd performs the function of configuring and broadcasting the beacon
frames for the wireless network. Radius server is used to maintain the authen-
tication and authorisation in the wireless networks. Easyhotspot is used to
customise the captive portal provided by Coovachilli. We configure the beacon
frame fields of the ET similar to that of legitimate one. However, some of the
fields could not be modified, such as in the Country element, the maximum
transit power level option can not be set manually, Vendor-Specific element can
not be forged, etc. Due to the difference in above fields, ETGuard detects the
presence of ET in the network.
Additionally, we launched ETs using other open source softwares, even if
they don’t permit the captive portal facility. We created ET of CSE using
ap-hotspot[37], aircrack-ng[38] suite and default unity network manager[39] of
ubuntu OS (Operating System). Table 3 specifies the operating system and
wireless chipset details that are used for launching ETs in the network. These
softwares does not provide a good amount of user control. The configurable
fields permitted by these softwares are modified, but still many of the fields
differ. Table 4 shows the similar and dissimilar fields of these softwares as com-
pared to the legitimate AP CSE. We can observe from the table that aircrack-ng
does not contain many beacon frame fields such as TIM, DTIM, Extended Sup-
27
Table 3: Operating systems and drivers used in experiments of software access points.
S.No. Operating System Wireless Chipset
1 Ubuntu 14.04 LTS Intel Corporation Wireless
3160 (rev 93)
2 Ubuntu 16.04 Qualcomm Atheros QCA9565
/ AR9565 Wireless Network
Adapter (rev 01)
3 Ubuntu 12.04 Broadcom Corporation
BCM4312 802.11b/g LP-
PHY (rev 01)
port Rates and Vendor-Specific. It does not provide user control to modify these
fields. One interesting thing to notice is that, DTIM Period of software APs is
by default 2. We successfully detected ETs created by the above softwares.
ETGuard is also tested with the ETs administered in the network by means
of mobile hotspots. We establish ETs using Android devices of Sony, Motorola,
Lenovo and Redmi. We forged the SSID and BSSID of these hotspots. ET-
Guard successfully identified the ETs in the network, as the the fields in beacon
frames of hotspots and the legitimate one differ (as depicted in Table 4). Mobile
hotspot provides the minimum control to users and therefore, modifications of
beacon frame fields is not possible.
Further, we conducted the experiments for the three attack scenarios (Re-
mote Location/Colocation/Substitution) explained in Subsection 3.4. We anal-
ysed that ETGuard effectively handles Colocation attack scenario. For Substi-
tution attack scenario, if an AP is substituted with an ET of different OEM,
ETGuard effortlessly detects it. If an AP is replaced with an ET of exactly same
OEM and model, but transmits higher signal strength, ETGuard is capable of
detecting it. However, if the AP is replaced with an ET of exactly same OEM
and model, and transmits precisely similar signal strength, ETGuard may not
be able to detect it. In the case of Remote Location attack scenario, genuine
AP is not present in the network. The attacker can locate ET at any location in
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Evil Twin
Beacon
Frame
Length
SSID BSSID
Beacon
Interval
Capability
Informa-
tion
Supported
Rates
TIM
Length
DTIM
Period
Country RSN
Extended
Support
Rates
Vendor-
Specific
H
a
r
d
w
a
r
e
D-Link DIR-615
Wireless-N300
Router
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NA NA No No
Digisol DG-
HR1400 Wireless
Broadband Router
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NA NA No No
TP-Link TL-
WR841N 300Mbps
Wireless-N Router
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes NA NA No No
Mi 3C Router No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No NA No No
S
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
hostapd No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes NA NA No No
unity network
manager
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No NA NA No No
ap-hotspot No Yes Yes No No No Yes No NA NA No No
aircrack-ng No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No NA No No
M
o
b
i
l
e
H
o
t
s
p
o
t
Sony Xperia Z No Yes Yes Yes No No No No NA NA No No
Redmi Note 4 No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No NA NA No No
Moto G5 Plus No Yes Yes Yes No No No No NA NA No No
Lenovo Tab A7 No Yes Yes Yes No No No No NA NA No No
Table 4: Experimental results on different devices (hardware/software/mobile hotspots)
• Yes: The field is similar in beacon frame of ET and AP CSE.
• No: The field is not similar in beacon frame of ET and AP CSE.
• Yes: The field is modified in ET to become similar to AP CSE.
• No: The field is not present in legitimate AP CSE but present in ET.
• NA:- The field in neither present in AP CSE nor in ET of CSE.
2
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the network. ETGuard can detect the ET in every situation, unless an attacker
situates an ET of exactly same OEM and model, and even manages to trans-
mit similar signal strength as of original AP. This is an extremely rare scenario
because determining the OEM, model and strength for an AP that has been
removed from the network is an extremely challenging task. So, we rule out this
possibility. Notably, ETGuard maintains the database entries for removed APs
to prevent Remote Location attack.
5.2.4. Accuracy
To assess the accuracy of ETGuard, we discuss the false-positives and false-
negatives incurred by ETGuard. In this work, the positive and negative factors
are defined as:
• True-Positive (TP): If the AP is genuine, and ETGuard identifies it as a
genuine AP, the result is considered as TP.
• False-Positive (FP): If the AP is an ET introduced in the network, and
ETGuard identifies it as a genuine AP, the result is considered as FP.
• True-Negative (TN): If the AP is an ET introduced in the network, and
ETGuard detects it as an ET, the result is considered as TN.
• False-Negative (FN): If the AP is genuine, and ETGuard detects it as an
ET, the result is considered as FN.
ETGuard incurs only one case of FP, when an attacker launches a Substitution
attack scenario with an ET of exactly same OEM and model, and transmits
identical signal strength as of genuine AP. When an ET of similar OEM and
model (as that of original AP) is launched in the network, the beacon frame
components of the ET are analogous to the genuine AP. So, the first attempt of
ETGuard to match the fingerprints is unable to identify the ET (see the Algo-
rithm 1). Further, ETGuard compares the stored signal strength of original AP
with the ET. If the attacker maintains the signal strength similar to the original
one, ETGuard incurs FP. However, ETGuard incurs no FNs. The reason for
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obtaining only one case of FP and no cases of FN is the difference in various
hardware and driver dependent fields in beacon frames such as TIM, Capability
Information, Supported Rates, Vendor-Specific, and RSN settings (The reasons
for difference in such fields are explained in Subsection 4.2). Further, signal
strength element of beacon frames is a network dependent component. Since
these fields are not modifiable, and also vary from OEM to OEM for hardware
AP, from hardware AP to software AP, from hardware AP to mobile hotspot,
and from mobile hotspot to software AP, thus, ETGuard is capable of success-
fully detecting all types of ETs and ET attack scenarios with very less FPs and
no FNs.
5.3. Client App Interface for ETGuard
We provide an app interface for users which on contrary to Android WI-FI
settings, displays SSID, BSSID and signal strength of the AP. This app initially
sends request to the server for network scanning, and on receiving the response,
it refreshes the WI-FI list and highlights the ETs with red color to assist user
in connecting with the legitimate AP.
5.4. Discussion
ETGuard experiences a delay between receiving the client request and re-
sponding with the ETs present in the network. ETGuard comprises of 7 modules
(as explained in Section 4). The delay is incurred at the Packet Handler mod-
ule, as it captures beacon frames on 13 channels in the network (as explained
in Subsection 5.1). The duration to capture the frames on the channels can be
adjusted based on the location of ETGuard in the network. If the APs are in
a clear range of ETGuard, duration can be reduced, or else frames need to be
captured for a longer duration. Since an AP transmit a beacon frame every
102.4ms[20], the duration for capturing beacon frames should be greater than
102.4ms. Further, the Extractor module extracts the relevant fields from the
beacon frames one by one, and forwards it to the Processing Module. Since
31
the fields extracted for fingerprinting are not arranged sequentially in the bea-
con frames, and also the size of fields is not constant for each beacon frame,
this module incurs a delay. In our experiments, Extractor module of ETGuard
incurred a delay of 650ms. Further, the Processing Module and Fingerprint
Storage Engine module incurs a very negligible delay, as mysql processing is
extremely fast. Thus, ETGuard incurs a delay of few seconds.
ETGuard is easy to deploy in any network, as only 1 out of 7 modules of
ETGuard needs modification, i.e., Fingerprint Storage Engine requires modi-
fication. Since Fingerprint Storage Engine stores the fingerprints of the APs
present in the network, this module varies from network to network, and needs
to be updated for every network. Rest all the modules are not network de-
pendent. Further, ETGuard is proposed to detect the presence of ETs for
infrastructure based networks, i.e., local networks. To extend the deployment
of ETGuard for global networks, multiple instances of ETGuard needs to be
installed, depending on the physical range of the network. Let us assume that
the global network contains multiple APs of similar OEM, model, and config-
ured with similar SSID. The fingerprints of these APs differ, as some of the
beacon frame components among such APs are different, such as MAC address
and signal strength. Thus, only the Fingerprint Storage Engine module needs
modification. Thus, ETGuard is practically feasible and easy to deploy in any
network setting. Notably, other than MAC address and signal strength fields
of beacon frame, all the other fields used for fingerprinting are network and
region independent, and therefore, does not affect the fingerprints, and hence,
the deployment.
5.5. Comparison with Existing Techniques
We have compared ETGuard with existing state-of-the-art approaches on the
basis of various parameters, such as whether the approach could detect an ET
before association or not, whether the approach can detect all the three types of
ETs (hardware/software/mobile hotspot) or not, whether the approach handles
all the three types of attack scenarios (Remote Location/Colocation/Substitu-
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= The technique ideally handles it, = The technique uses it but it is not ideal for a practical solution, = The
technique does not handle it, but an ideal solution should handle it, = The technique does not ideally uses it and =
The technique cannot handle all the cases of it.
S.
No.
Technique
Pre-
Association
H/W S/W Hotspot
Remote
Location
Colocation Substitution
Extra
H/w
Utilised
Protocol
Modifica-
tion
1 ETGuard
2 DRET[7]
3
ET
Detector[40]
4
Hacker’s
Toolbox[41]
5 CETAD[3]
6 TSF[42]
7
ClockSkew
+
Temperature[43]
8
Inter-
packet
arrival
time[4]
9 WifiHop[5]
10 SOWA[44]
11 ETSniffer[2]
Table 5: Comparison of ETGuard with the existing state-of-the-art approaches
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tion) or not, whether the approach utilises any extra hardware for analysis or
not, and whether the approach modifies any protocols for ET detection or not.
The comparison is illustrated in Table 5. The less the number of filled circle or
square ( and respectively) in the row of a particular technique, the more
effective the technique is for ET detection. According to Table 5, DRET[7] can-
not detect ETs created through softwares and mobile hotspots, and unable to
handle Colocation and Substitution attack scenarios for ET launch, because it
uses SSI to locate only stationary ETs, and they assume that attacker launches
an ET at a remote location from the genuine AP. Hacker’s Toolbox[41] can only
detect software ETs. Similarly, TSF[42] solely handles software APs. How-
ever it utilises an extra monitoring device which makes it infeasible for the real
environment. Likewise, ClockSkew + Temperature[43] also utilises an extra
hardware for ET detection, and can only deal with hardware ETs. Furthermore,
Inter-packet arrival time[4] cannot identify ETs launched through softwares and
mobile hotspots. CETAD[3], ETSniffer[2], ET Detector[40] and WifiHop[5] are
not pre-association techniques. SOWA[44] incorporates protocol modification to
detect hardware ETs. They have incorporated digital certificate based unique
identification for APs. However, it requires a central certification authority
and complete protocol modification, and thus, cannot be deployed in real en-
vironment. Our proposed approach named as ETGuard is a pre-association
technique, can handle all types of ETs, does not modify any protocols, does
not enforce any additional expensive hardware, and handles all attack scenarios
with a limitation in Substitution attack scenario. ETGuard can not handle a
case where an attacker has substituted the AP with an ET of same OEM and
model, and transmits signal strength similar to that of AP. However, this is
a rarest scenario. Thus, we can assert from the comparison in Table 5 that
ETGuard outperforms the existing approaches for ET detection.
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6. Related Work
In this section, we discuss the existing literature of two realms - D2D attacks
on Android and ET detection techniques.
6.1. D2D Attacks on Android
Since Android is based on Linux kernel, it inherits Linux kernel features,
either without modification, or with slight alteration. As Linux is vulnerable to
certain D2D attacks such as MITM, sniffing, replay attacks, etc., Android too
becomes susceptible to these attacks. The most recent attack on Android is the
Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK)[45]. This attack exploits the 4-way hand-
shake mechanism of wpa supplicant to bluff Android devices to reuse nonces,
and reinstall an all zero encryption key. Thus, the attacker can either replay,
or decrypt, or forge the data frames. Another popular attack on Android de-
vices includes MITM attack. MalloDroid[46] statically analyses Android apps
for improper and vulnerable usage of SSL by inspecting the code for SSL us-
age, hostname verification and certificate trust APIs. However, MalloDroid
does not conduct data flow analysis, and hence, may incur a lot of false pos-
itives. Another exploitable feature acquired by Android from Linux includes
socket implementation for device to device communication over the network.
OPAnalyzer[11] statically analyses Android apps for open port vulnerabilities.
It takes into account three classes of adversaries - malicious app on the same de-
vice, local network attacker and malicious scripts on the web. It conducts entry
point analysis, followed by taint analysis and reachability analysis to confirm
the vulnerabilities in an app. However, it only handles TCP sockets, and does
not consider sensitive information transmission from native layer to java layer.
6.2. ET Detection
We classified the existing solutions in two categories - pre-association and
post-association. The post-association techniques require connectivity with the
AP for the detection of ET, and on the contrary, pre-association techniques are
capable of detecting ETs before the connection and transmission of data traffic.
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6.2.1. Pre-association
SOWA[44] implements protocol modification for ensuring protection against
ETs. It ties the SSID with a certificate issued by a valid certification authority,
and checks the certificate of an AP before connecting to it. However, the so-
lution is not feasible as the deployment needs the firmware and drivers of APs
and clients to get updated. Neumann et al.[47] utilises the inter-packet arrival
time to identify ETs. They construct histogram for the frame arrival times of
individual APs. However, during implementation, the detection rate falls to
50-60%, and thus, not a feasible solution. Some approaches construct hardware
fingerprints using obligatory physical phenomenon such as clock skew. Jana et
al.[48] utilises the clock skew phenomenon to create hardware fingerprints for
an AP. The clock skew induces clocks based on crystal oscillators to possess
slight alterations in speed. However, many APs reflected similar alterations,
and thus, the technique fails in efficiently detecting ETs. Further, Lanze et
al.[43] improved the clock skew based technique by including underlying device
dependency on temperature to detect ETs. DRET[7] utilises radiometric signal
properties to locate ETs. The technique is based on the hypothesis that the
RSSI values of an AP located at a particular place is always same. However, it
does not consider the fact that RSSI values oscillate due to hazy effects, and are
not always the same. Unfortunately, the above techniques can only detect ETs
created through hardwares. Lanze et al.[42] proposed a dedicated approach for
detection of software APs by using Timing Synchronization Functions (TSF).
They recorded the timestamps for beacon transmissions of software APs, and
plotted them. According to them, hardware APs always form a linear pattern,
whereas, software APs possess outliers. None of the pre-association techniques
are suitable for detecting ETs constructed through mobile hotspots.
6.2.2. Post-association
ETSniffer[2] proposed two algorithms - Training Mean Matching (TMM)
and Hop Differentiating Technique (HDT) for detection of ETs. TMM employs
Inter-packet arrival time as the differentiating characteristic between genuine
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and fake AP. It considers the fact that genuine AP follows one-hop network
topology, whereas, an ET follows multi-hop topology, as an ET uses genuine
AP to provide Internet connectivity. TMM trains the values of Inter-packet
arrival time for one hop and multi-hop topology. HDT improves TMM by re-
moving the need of training because HDT analyses Server-to-AP Inter-packet
arrival time ratio and assumes a theoretical value for the topologies. Similarly,
WifiHop[5] also considers difference in the network topology of an AP and an
ET as a detection parameter. They transmit watermarked packets on the net-
work before the user traffic to check whether the packets are transmitted on the
correct route or not. Further, ET Detector[40] also monitors the behavior of
packets in the network to detect ETs. They assume the fact that ET will trans-
mit the packet to the real AP to forward it further. CETAD[3] detects an ET on
the basis of three parameters - difference in the Internet Service Provider, RTT
and the standard deviation of RTT. The post-association techniques are inca-
pable of preventing Invoking Malicious Component attack (explained in Section
2) launched through ETs.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we demonstrate the impact of D2D attacks on Android devices,
launched in a network using ETs. We illustrate the launch and adverse effect of
the “Invoking Malicious Component” attack on Android. The attack possesses
the capability of inflicting an Android device before the connection and trans-
mission of data traffic through an ET. The contemporary ET detection solutions
are incapable of preventing this attack because either they analyse an ET after
the relay of user traffic through it, or they can detect this attack only for hard-
ware ETs. We propose an automated, online, incremental, fingerprinting based
pre-association technique known as ETGuard, which utilises beacon frames to
fingerprint an AP. The fingerprints are stored on the server which is requested
by the client app installed on an Android device to scan the network for ETs
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in real-time. The advantages of ETGuard are manifold - it does not need any
expertise for deployment, no expensive hardware is used and no protocols are
adapted. To assess the performance of ETGuard, we deploy it in real network,
and launch ETs using hardware, software and hotspots. ETGuard successfully
identifies all scenarios of ET launch with no false negatives, but incurred false
positives in one scenario when an attacker substitutes an AP with an ET of
exactly same OEM and model, and transmits signal strength similar to that of
original AP. In future, we plan to extend ETGuard for handling the Substitu-
tion attack scenario for ET and AP belonging to the same OEM. We also plan
to offload the detection mechanism on Android devices, instead of following the
client-server architecture.
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